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LABOR LAW-A STANDARD FOR "REASONABLE" CONCERTED ACTIVITY. NLRB v. Modern Carpet Industries,Inc., 611
F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).

INTRODUCTION
In NLRB v. Modern Carpet Industries, Inc.,' the National Labor
Relations Board (Board) asked the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit to enforce a Board order 2 reinstating three employees who
walked off the job. The Board had found that the employees had refused to complete their work assignment because they honestly believed that their employer was asking them to melt radioactive lead.
The court of appeals enforced the order, holding that the National
Labor Relations Act 3 (Act) protected even unreasonable activities by
employees, as long as the employees honestly believed that they had
acted for their mutual aid or protection. The court, however, failed
to analyze the cases which it cited and neglected to discuss the
rationale underlying its holding. This note will supply that missing
analysis, identify the labor law policies furthered by the decision,
and discuss some possible harsh applications of this holding on employers.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Modern Carpet Industries operated a small carpet mill in Oklahoma.4 At the time of the incident, the company's maintenance department consisted of a supervisor, Sanders, and three employees,
Clough, Dickson, and Ball. The maintenance department employees
occasionally melted lead and poured it around the base of the carpettufting machines to stabilize them. In August of 1977, Sanders told
two of the maintenance employees that the company had purchased
four hundred pounds of lead which had been used at a hospital to
store radioactive materials. Clough mentioned this to his wife, a
nurse, who warned him that the lead was very dangerous. Clough re1. 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).
2. Modern Carpet Industries, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1978).

3. 29 U.S.C. § § 151-160 (1976 & Supp. III 1980).

4. The administrative law judge found at the hearing that the Georgia corporation had
purchased and received goods in excess of $50,000 from points outside Oklahoma during
the year before the hearing, thus placing the company under the jurisdiction of the Act.

236 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1978). See 29 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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peated the warning to Ball and Dickson. Approximately one week
later, when Sanders told the men that they were going to melt the
lead, Ball protested saying, "it possibly could be dangerous from
radioactivity." 5 They did help Sanders prepare to melt the lead,
however, and left at their normal quitting time.
The following day, Sanders told the men that they must melt the
lead or be fired. When Ball asked Sanders if the lead had been tested
for radioactivity, Sanders replied that he had called the night before
and had been assured that the lead was safe. When the employees
continued to question Sanders, he admitted that the comptroller had
actually made the call. The employees went to the comptroller to
question him about the telephone call. He assured them that the lead
was safe, explaining that it had been used to store molybdenum,
which has a half-life of forty-eight hours, that government regulations required the seller to wait three months before disposing of the
6
lead, and that the radioactive material could not penetrate it. The
employees, however, did no feel reassured and left the mill. The
three men soon received termination checks and notices informing
them that they had been fired for "insubordination, violation of
7
company rules and failure to follow instructions."
Board allegRelations
A charge was filed' with the National Labor
aid and
mutual
their
for
concert
in
ing that the employees had acted
9 The Board issued an order which asserted that the emprotection.
1
ployer could not terminate the employees for walking off the job 0
because they had acted in good faith to protect themselves from
what they perceived to be a danger in the workplace.
At the hearing before the administrative law judge,' 1 the three
5. 611 F.2d at 813.
6. An OSHA report, sought to be introduced into evidence at the administrative law
judge's hearing, confirmed the comptroller's information and concluded the lead was not
harmful The report was excluded, however, because the judge ruled the veracity of the employees' belief was irrelevant to his decision. Brief for Respondent at 6, NLRB v. Modern
Carpet Industries, Inc., 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).
7. 611 F.2d at 813.
8. Although the complaint was filed by the International Union, all Industrial Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, the Union was not involved in either the employees' refusal to work
with the lead or with their subsequent firings.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (commonly referred to as section 7 of the NationI Labor Relations Act) grants employees the right "to engage in other concerted activities for ...
mutual aid or protection." Because the three men had talked among themselves about their
fears and had walked off the job together, the men acted in concert.
10. Section 7 of the Act is enforced by 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (section a). That section
declares that "[i] t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 157."
11. After the complaint was filed, the employer had an opportunity to file an answer.
The case was then tried in Oklahoma before the administrative law judge pursuant to section
10 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)-(c) (1976).
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employees testified about their fears of the "radioactive lead" and
their attempts to have their employer test the lead. Modern Carpet
Industries defended the alleged unfair labor practice by arguing that
the employees' fears were unfounded and hence unreasonable.' 2 The
administrative law judge dismissed this defense, stating that the unreasonableness of the fear "is not an element to be considered when
employees are discharged."' I Finding that the three men had actually feared for their safety, the administrative law judge held that
the employer had committed an unfair labor practice. He ordered
Modern Carpet Industries to reinstate the employees.
On appeal by the employer, a three-member panel of the National
Labor Relations Board affirmed the administrative law judge's findings and conclusion and adopted his recommended order.' ' The
Board applied to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for enforcement of its order when the employer refused to comply with
the order.' I The court affirmed the decision and ordered enforcement of the Board's order.' 6
ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
The issue in Modern Carpet Industries was whether the National
Labor Relations Act should protect employees who, while acting
in good faith, participate in unreasonable concerted activities. The
Board had determined that the Act should protect the employees in
this case, even if, in retrospect, their apprehensions about the lead
were unrealistic. Although failing to adequately analyze the issue, the
court of appeals accepted the Board's interpretation of the case law
and reached the same conclusion. While the court's decision in Modern Carpet Industries appears equitable under the facts of the case,
the court's language sweeps too broadly. Employers, unaware that
their employees consider themselves to be involved in a labor dispute,
now run the grave risk of being found to have committed an unfair
labor practice when they discipline employees for their actions.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to engage in con12. Modern Carpet Industries was not represented by legal counsel at the hearing with
the administrative law judge. The comptroller presented the company's evidence. The company had two other defenses: 1) the employees were discharged for economic reasons, and
2) the employees violated company policy by walking off the job; neither defense was
proven at the hearing. 236 N .L.R.B. at 1015; Brief for Respondent at 4, NLRB v. Modern
Carpet Industries, Inc., 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).
13. 236 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
14. Modern Carpet Industries, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1978).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(3) (1976).
16. NLRB v. Modern Carpet Industries, Inc., 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).
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certed activities for their mutual aid or protection.'

7

Section 8 pro-

tects that right by stating that an employer's interference with the
exercise of section 7 rights shall be an unfair labor practice.' 8 While

the two sections appear at first glance to afford unlimited protection
to employees who engage in concerted activities for their protection,
the federal courts have limited this protection. For example, employees' concerted activities for their mutual protection are not protected by the Act if the activities are unlawful,'

an employer to breach a contract,

2'

9

violent,'

0

call for

or are otherwise indefensible.' 2

The employer in this case urged the court to hold that unreasonable
conduct by employees was similarly unprotected by the Act. Think-

ing that the issue had been foreclosed by a United States Supreme
Court case, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.," the court of appeals in Modern Carpet Industries rejected this argument. Citing
Washington Aluminum, 2 4 the court held that it could not examine
2
or the
the reasonableness of either the underlying labor dispute
17. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
19. Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (an unlawful mutiny or work
stoppage on board a vessel by seamen).
20. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (a week-long physical
takeover of the plant buildings).
21. NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (an attempt by employees
to force the employer to violate seniority clauses in a contract).
22. NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953). The employees of Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company, a new television station in North
Carolina, were in dispute with their employer over wages, hours and working conditions.
The employees distributed handbills which criticized the policies and limited programming
of the television station, but did not mention the underlying labor dispute. The U.S. Supreme Court found the handbills "reasonably calculated to harm the company's reputation
and reduce its income," 346 U.S. at 471, and hence their distribution was unprotected concerted activity under section 7 of the Act.
In Modern Carpet Industries' argument before the court, the employer argued that the
employees' conduct was indefensible and hence unprotected by section 7 of the Act. Brief
for Respondent, NLRB v. Modern Carpet Industries, Inc., 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).
In support of this defense the employer argued that the employees were spreading false,
harmful rumors about safety conditions at the mill and were disparaging the company. The
court rejected the argument without responding to it in its opinion.
In comparing the present case with the Jefferson Standard example of indefensible conduct, it is clear why the court found the comparison inapplicable. First, the rumors about
the "radioactive lead" were not directed toward the mill's customers or the public at large,
as were the pamphlets in Jefferson Standard. Second, the rumors concerned a suspected
health hazard in the workplace while the pamphlets in Jefferson Standard did not mention
the underlying labor dispute. Third, the employees in the present case were genuinely concerned about health and safety risks to themselves and had no intent to harm their employer.
23. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
24. Id.
25. A "labor dispute" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976) as "any controversy conThe Board must find that a labor
cerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment ....
dispute exists before the Board has the power to order reinstatement of a wrongfully discharged employee. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
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means by which the employees chose to communicate the dispute to
their employer. Washington Aluminum, however, stood only for the
latter proposition. The court in Modern Carpet Industries extended
the holding of Washington Aluminum to cover a factual situation
which the United States Supreme Court had never considered.
In Washington Aluminum, the employer had discharged seven men
who walked out one bitterly cold morning to protest the lack of heat
in their plant. The Board found that the men had acted in protest
over the lack of heat and held that the walkout, while extreme conduct under the circumstances, was protected by section 7 of the Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the
made 2an
Board's order, however, because the employees had never
plant. 6
the
leaving
before
employer
the
to
heat
actual demand for
The Supreme Court reversed, writing that the fact that the employees
left "without affording the company an 'opportunity to avoid the
work stoppage' by granting a concession to the demand' "2 did not
render the walkout unprotected. That fact merely meant that, in
retrospect, the employees' actions appeared unwise. The Court held
that once it had determined that a labor dispute existed, the Court
would not attempt to weigh the reasonableness of the employees'
concerted activities to determine whether those activities were protected by the Act. As the Court explained, "the reasonableness of
to
workers' decisions to engage in concerted activities is irrelevant
2 8 Hence,
the determination of whether a labor dispute exists or not."
2
once the Court had determined 1) that a labor dispute existed, 9 2)
that the concerted activities of the employees arose as a consequence
of that labor dispute, 3" and 3) that the activities were not unlawful,
violent, or indefensible, the Court concluded that those activities
were protected by section 7 of the Act.
In its brief submitted in Modern CarpetIndustries, the Board cited
Washington Aluminum as holding that the merits of the underlying
the Act protects cerdispute were irrelevant in determining whether
3
The court of appeals in
tain concerted activities by employees.
Modern Carpet Industries adopted this statement as the controlling
26. 291 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
27. 370 U.S. at 13.
28. 370 U.S. at 16, citing as authority NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1948).
29. Note 25, supra.
Telegraph
30. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
to deCo., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The Court admonished the Board that it was unnecessary
the
was
strike
labor
a
that
determining
when
were
negotiations
labor
stage
what
termine at
a
calling
of
reasonableness
the
not
causation,
was
issue
The
consequence of a labor dispute.
strike.
F.2d 811
31. Brief for Petitioner at 7, NLRB v. Modern Carpet Industries, Inc., 611
(10th Cir. 1979).
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legal principle of the case, without considering that the United States
Supreme Court itself had examined the merits of the labor dispute
over lack of heat in the plant in Washington Aluminum before grant-

ing the Act's protection to the employees' walkout. In that case, the
Supreme Court examined the evidence and determined for itself how

cold it was in the plant that morning. Noting the inadequate furnaces
installed in the workplace, the fact that one furnace had stopped
working overnight, and the range in temperature from eleven degrees
to twenty-two degrees Fahrenheit that day, the Court concluded that
the employees had a legitimate dispute with their employer about
heat in the plant. Thus, the Court did not find itself barred from examining the evidence concerning the dispute which caused the employees to walk out. It was precluded only from weighing the reason-

ableness of a walkout as a means of communicating the demand for

heat to the employer against a less drastic measure of communicating
that demand. 2
The Board adopted a broad interpretation of Washington Aluminum in order to protect the employees in Modern CarpetIndustries
from 20/20 hindsight after all the information about the "labor dispute" was before the court. The Board realized that the employees in
this case had no means of testing the lead to see if it was radioactive.
The employees followed the only course of action open to them;
they asked their employer to test the lead and, when their employer
seemingly refused to do so, they walked out of the mill." The em32. Interestingly enough, after the United States Supreme Court decided Washington
Aluminum, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit weighed the employees'
method of
communicating their demand to their employer (a walkout) against other available
means
and concluded that the method chosen by the employees was unreasonable and
was thus
unprotected concerted activity. Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th
Cir. 1963),
involved waitresses who walked off the job during the dinner hour to protest the
firing of
the assistant manager. Conceding that the firing was within the "realm of proper
employee
interest," 325 F.2d at 539 and that the firing caused the walkout, the court concluded,
nevertheless, that the walkout was unprotected because it was not "reasonably
related to
the ends sought to be achieved." 325 F.2d at 538. The court distinguished
Washington
Aluminum saying there "the walkout, while extreme under the circumstances,
was reasonably related to the complaint." 325 F.2d at 539. The Board has specifically rejected
this analysis stating "we must respectfully disagree with any rule which would base the
determination of whether a strike is protected upon its reasonableness in relation to the subject
matter
of the 'labor dispute.' " Plastilit Corporation, 153 NLRB 180, 183 (1965), enf'd
375 F.2d
343 (8th Cir. 1967).
33. If the employees were represented by a union, presumably they would have
had
more options open to them. The union could have demanded, perhaps in a more
articulate
manner, that the lead be guaranteed to be non-radioactive. The United States
Supreme
Court, in construing section 502 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976), seemed to
recognize
that unions would have more power in this situation than individual employees would
have.
Thus, a work stoppage occurring because of dangerous work conditions which would
ordinarily violate the no-strike provision of a work contract, will not be held to be
a "strike"
only if the union can present "ascertainable, objective evidence supporting [the
union's]
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ployer held the balance of power in this situation because the employer had the knowledge and the ability to convince the employees
that there was no safety risk if they worked with the lead. The court
apparently adopted this rationale when it wrote,
The company did not act with intelligence in the matter. If indeed
the lead was harmless, management could at least have told the employees who made the appraisal or, better still, they could have
writing assuming liability for any harm that
made a statement 3in
4
might be sustained.
The court assumed that by purposefully withholding information
emfrom the employees or by refusing to respond adequately to the
led
which
ployees' question, the employer precipitated the dispute
wherethe
had
to the concerted activities. Thus, since the employer
withal to avoid the dispute, the employer ought to bear the blame
for causing the dispute, in effect, by being found guilty of committing an unfair labor practice.
Similar considerations based on balance of power were present in
two cases cited by the court with approval in Modern Carpet Industries.3 s In both cases, the employer fired employees for participating
in concerted activities, activities which the employees thought were
evinecessary for their protection. As in the present case, objective
labor
a
that
beliefs
employees'
the
dence was unavailable to support
3
dispute existed. In Du-Tri Displays, Inc., 6 an employee was discharged for complaining to OSHA on behalf of himself and his fellow
employees about lacquer fumes in their plant. Even though the laborof
atory tests later conducted at the plant showed that the level
Board
the
acceptable,
was
air
the
in
potentially harmful chemicals
of
still held that the employees' actions were protected by section 7
the
believed
actually
employee
the
that
found
the Act. The Board
fumes were making him and his co-workers ill. His honest belief that
a danger existed in the workplace, the Board held, meant that the
in
Act protected his activities. The second case cited by the court
exists." Gateway Coal
conclusion that an abnormally dangerous work condition for work
under section 502
standard
The
(1974).
386-87
368,
U.S.
414
Workers,
Co. v. United Mine
to gather such
able
be
would
union
the
because
is a strict, objective standard presumably
safety of employees.
evidence before concluding a walkout was necessary to protect the
34. 611 F.2d at 814-15.
Corporation, 181
35. Du-Tri Displays, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 1261 (1977); Ben Pekin
and the court
Board
the
Both
1971).
Cir.
(7th
205
F.2d
452
N.L.R.B. 1025 (1970), enf'd,
N.L.R.B. 999 (1975),
in Modern Carpet Industries cited Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221
an employee that a labor
but that case did not involve an unreasonable belief on the part of
complaints about
making
for
discharged
was
employee
an
case
that
In
existed.
dispute
however, verified
report,
OSHA
subsequent
The
OSHA.
to
plant
the
safety violations in
those violations.
36. 231 N.L.R.B. 1261 (1977).
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Modern Carpet Industries involved a labor dispute over wages. In
NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp.,3 1 the Union told an employee, whose
employer had an informal agreement with the Union concerning
wages, that he and his fellow employees would receive a $75 monthly
raise. When the raise came only to $27, the employee confronted his
supervisor and a Union official asking both, "Is there a pay-off
here?" 3" The supervisor fired the employee for the remark. The
court, concluding that the employee's remark was not so defamatory
as to make it indefensible, held that the issue was whether the employee actually believed a labor dispute over wages existed. Concluding that his remark resulted from his actual belief that he and his fellow employees3 were being cheated out of a promised raise, the
court held that the Act protected his activities.
Like the employees in Modern CarpetIndustries, the employees in
Du-Tri and Ben Pekin had few options available to them. Once they
believed they were embroiled in a labor dispute with their employers,
and once their employers refused to respond to the employees' concerns, the employees took the only course of action they saw available. The employer held the balance of power in both situations; the
employer had the means to "solve" the labor dispute but chose not
to exercise those means. Thus, because the employer could have prevented the "labor dispute" from erupting in the first place, the employer was held responsible for firing its employees when they acted
in response to the "labor dispute."
What both the court and the Board failed to consider in the present case is whether it is fair to impute the knowledge of the "labor
dispute" to the employer. The employer in Modern CarpetIndustries
admitted in its brief that the president of the company knew that
there was a rumor in the mill that the lead was unsafe. 4 0 Thus, the
court may have assumed that it was not unjust to impute to the employer the knowledge that a labor dispute over safe working conditions existed in the minds of some employees, because the employer
admitted having some notice of the dispute. But the court's opinion
did not articulate this limitation. The holding of Modern Carpet Industries also extends the sanctions of the Act to those employers who
are totally unaware that their employees consider themselves to be
37. 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971).
38. Id. at 206.
39. Even though the employees in Du-Tri Displays and Ben Pekin
acted alone, their
actions were deemed to be concerted actions because they acted to
protect or help fellow
employees as well. See Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
40. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, NLRB v. Modern Carpet Industries,
Inc., 611 F.2d 811
(10th Cir. 1979).
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of a labor dispute
embroiled in a labor dispute. Since the existence
4
now depends, at least in the Tenth Circuit, " on the honest belief of
an employee that a dispute over terms, tenure, or conditions of employment exists, employers will have to be especially responsive to
employees' perceptions. While furthering increased consideration by
employers for employees' concerns may be an admirable goal of the
Act, the court has chosen a very harsh method to achieve this goal.
Employers who attempt to discipline employees for work stoppages
or walkouts will first have to consider whether the employees might
have thought that these actions were necessary for their health or
safety. Even if the employer cannot perceive the danger, the employer will be held to have committed an unfair labor practice by
disciplining employees who acted because they honestly believed
there was a danger in the workplace. This case provides a clear example of a perceived danger in the workplace that the employees
actually and honestly believed existed, but of which the employer
could be totally unaware. If the employer had not heard a rumor
that employees thought certain material was radioactive, the employer would have had no notice of the perceived danger. Nevertheless, the court would hold the employer responsible under the Act
for all disciplinary measures taken against the employees, solely because the employees actually believed they had to walk off the job to
protect themselves.
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has extended the protection
of the National Labor Relations Act to employees who act in good
faith for their mutual aid or safety even when their actions later seem
unreasonable. Once the court had adopted this legal conclusion, the
sole issue was whether the employees honestly believed the lead their
employer was asking them to work with was radioactive. Adopting
the Board's finding concerning the employees' belief, the court held
that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice when the
employer fired the three employees. Although the employer acknowledged some notice of a rumor in the mill that the lead was dangerous,
the court did not limit its holding to those situations where the employer had notice that the employees thought a danger existed in the
this
41. The Tenth Circuit is probably not alone, although no other court has addressed
NLRB v. Ben Pekin
e.g.,
See,
Industries.
Carpet
Modern
in
did
court
the
as
precisely
as
issue
NLRB, 407 F.2d
Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v.
Cir. 1965); But,
(6th
406
F.2d
342
Co.,
Taylor
1357 (4th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Halsey W.
n. 15.
cf., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009 (3rd Cir. 1980)
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workplace. Such notice should be required in future cases, especially
when employees have an unreasonable belief in the existence of some
invisible danger. Otherwise, the subjective beliefs of the employees
become the sole determining factor when the court decides whether
a labor dispute exists, whether the activities arising out of the dispute
are protected activities, and whether the employer has committed an
unfair labor practice when the employer interferes with those activities.
BARBARA KOENIG

